On July 13, 2024, an assassination attempt on Donald Trump during a presidential campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, shook the nation. Trump was shot and wounded in his right ear, and one audience member was killed and two were critically injured. The Secret Service’s preliminary report has revealed a series of critical security failures that allowed the shooter to gain a dangerous advantage. From an unsecured building within the perimeter to lapses in communication between local law enforcement and federal agents, these oversights are now under scrutiny. This article delves into 12 key points from the report, along with suggestions for preventing such failures in the future.
When I was still in the field, I found the Secret Service of that era to be professional and enjoyable to work with. They appeared to be constantly vigilant while committed to creating an impenetrable blanket of protection around their charges.
The Secret Service preliminary report on the July 13 assassination attempt on Donald Trump (available in full below) suggests a different experience was had by the local officers in Butler, Pennsylvania that day.
12 steps to improved event security
Here are 12 points described in the report highlighting shortcomings in the Butler security effort. Additionally, I will suggest an approach I would take if tasked with improving the response:
1. The site in Butler was chosen for the rally because of the numbers it would accommodate, despite the security challenges it presented.
Next time: The safety of the crowd and the dignitary should be paramount when choosing a venue. If a venue is indefensible with the resources available, find one that is.
2. The Advance Secret Service Site Team Commander left the “AGR Building” (the location from which the shooter fired) out of the secure perimeter, even though it was obvious that for a shooter armed with a rifle on its roof, it would be a chip shot to hit anyone on stage or in the crowd.
Next time: The person constructing the security plan should not be selected by rank or geographical assignment. That person should be a specialist with knowledge and experience in security-site construction.
3. An area SWAT team was assigned to the event and placed inside the AGR Building without any pre-event meeting with a Secret Service representative to explain what was expected of them.
Next time: The Secret Service Site Commander must conduct a walk-through before the event to ensure barricades are in place and everyone knows their role. Local SWAT team commanders assigned to a location with no clear idea of the expectations of their team must seek clarification before the event begins.
4. The lack of efficacy of the SWAT team inside the AGR Building was discussed, but nothing was done to improve its response capability.
Next time: When SWAT team members communicate that they are clearly out of position to be effective, the team’s commander must relay that fact to those requesting their assistance. That commander should prepare suggestions for how to re-deploy more effectively.
5. The Secret Service team had an “unmanned aerial system advanced agent” (drone operator) assigned to them. Due to “technical problems,” the only drone flying above the site that day was the shooter’s.
Next time: In high-level protective assignments, redundant systems must be available for critical equipment. For example, during the Bush-Quayle administration, I was leading a vice presidential escort away from an event when the limo carrying the vice president broke down. Out of nowhere, a backup limo arrived, and the agents swiftly formed a diamond formation, moving the vice president to the new vehicle. We continued on our way, while a detail stayed behind with the original limo. After the vice president boarded the plane, the lead agent asked me the name of the intersection where the breakdown occurred. I told him it was ‘Hinkley and Bainbridge.’ He paused and said, ‘Holy s—t!’”
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6. The AGR roof, which allowed access without a ladder, was neither covered nor secured by anyone. The report states many recognized the need to secure that roof, but no one followed up by assigning someone there.
Next time: Anyone noticing such a glaring blind spot should cover it themselves, advise the command post of their actions and hold the position until other arrangements are made.
7. There were two separate command posts operating apart from each other: the Butler County Emergency Medical Services Command Post and the Secret Service Security Room.
Next time: The Incident Command System (ICS) is designed to avoid these situations. However, if two command posts are necessary, they should be established in close proximity, manned by liaisons with direct communication lines between them for real-time information exchanges.
8. The usual procedure of “colocation” (partnering between local officers and Secret Service) to overcome radio communication difficulties, ensuring real-time communication with both the local command post and the Secret Service Security Room was not effectively utilized in Butler.
Next time: A statewide emergency communication frequency should be available for all law enforcement officers working temporarily on a specific problem. If not available, the next best option is for Secret Service agents assigned to counter-sniper and counter-surveillance teams to work alongside local officers using local radios, allowing real-time communication with both command centers.
9. Many local officers were unaware that their communications were not being relayed in real-time to the Secret Service.
Next time: See Next time for point eight.
10. After Crooks was spotted with the range finder, the urgency of the search for him was not relayed to the protection team around the former president.
Next time: See Next time for point eight.
11. The Secret Service leadership did not properly communicate with those tasked with effectively carrying out the security plan, before or during the event, about what was expected of them to ensure success. This shortcoming contributed to the mission’s failure.
Next time: Pre-event briefings should be standard procedures for Secret Service operations, especially for critical operators.
12. Since the report states, “resources did not factor into this mission failure,” one can infer that better use of resources could have prevented this “mission failure.”
Next time: These events must be planned thoroughly, and everyone involved must know exactly how they fit into the plan. After these events: Debrief, debrief and debrief to fine-tune for future success.
|RELATED: History of presidential assassinations reminds us what has happened can happen again
Conclusion
The public resistance to any critical review by the former Secret Service Director in the immediate aftermath of this assassination attempt was not helpful to anyone, including that director.
Hopefully, this report signals the start of an honest self-critique coupled with the desire to make necessary changes to ensure future mission success. After all, this path of self-improvement through self-critique is in keeping with the Secret Service’s motto, “Worthy of Trust and Confidence.”
Besides, our national security depends on their success.
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