In a mixture of Arabic and heavily accented Russian, Dokku Umarov’s successor, Aliashab Alibulatovich Kebekov, also known as Sheikh Ali Abu Mukhammad ad-Dagestani, announced that he was the new emir of the Imirat Kavkaz (IK).1 Umarov, often referred to as Russia’s bin Laden, was declared dead at age 49 on March 19, 2014.2, 3 Various sources reported that he had been seriously wounded in a battle against Russian forces, succumbing to his injuries sometime between January and March, 2014.4 He had been reportedly killed eight times before, forced to retire by senior Chechen commanders, and then been reinstated as emir by an IK shariah court; however, this time he would not be returning from the dead.
Umarov’s death was confirmed by an IK media release and other terrorist organizations from Turkey to Syria. It was also confirmed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB).5 Umarov’s death was a major accomplishment for Putin, ending a decades-long manhunt for Russia’s most wanted terrorist, an event similar in importance to the killing of Osama bin Laden for the U.S. government. Russian authorities have accused Umarov of ordering Chechen rebels to carry out some 2,400 insurgency operations, including 54 suicide attacks, resulting in as many as 9,000 casualties.6 In addition to the more recent bombing of the Domodedovo airport in January 2011, and two metro stations using female suicide bombers in September 2010, Russian authorities believe that Umarov was behind other high casualty attacks such as the Moscow theater siege in 2002, which resulted in the deaths of 129 people.7, 8
In the months leading up to the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi, Umarov intensified his threats, resulting in significantly increased security actions by the Russian government. Umarov had encouraged his followers to use “any methods that Allah allows” to stop the Olympic Games, including biological weapons.9, 10 He attempted to enrage his followers with messages such as “they plan to hold the Olympics on the bones of our ancestors.” To his dismay, his demands went unanswered and led to nothing more than threats, fear, and the arrest of his followers. The Olympic Games concluded successfully and his aspirations for violence had been a humiliating failure.
Omar al-Shishani, a Chechen commander in the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and Abdullah Mansour, the leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), announced condolences and gave eulogies to Umarov.11, 12 According to the Kavkaz Center, precessions were held in several cities in Turkey, which were reportedly attended by thousands of Turkish Muslims.4 Mukhtar Abu al-Zubeir, the leader of al Qaeda’s branch in Syria, the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement, offered his condolences as well.13
Umarov’s Rise to Power
Umarov, also known as Dokku Umarov, was born April 13, 1964, in the village of Kharsenoi in the Shatoysky District of Southern Chechnya.14 Umarov’s first run-in with authorities was in 1980 with a conviction for reckless homicide. Following this incident, in 1992, he was wanted for murder and later for kidnapping. His military career began before 1994 when he served in the Special Forces under Ruslan Gelayev, a prominent commander in the Chechen separatist movement against Russia.15 In 1997, Umarov held the position of Secretary of the Security Council of the self-proclaimed Republic of Ichkeria.16
Chechnya is recognized as a Republic, or subject of Russia, split into two parts, the Republic of Ingushetia and the Chechen Republic, also referred to as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. In the first Chechen War with Russia, Ichkeria established independence, but surrendered this independence back to Russia following the second Chechen War.17 Chechen extremists continue to battle Russian forces with the goal of establishing an independent Islamic state. Umarov’s IK is supposed to be the manifestation of an independent Islamic state; however, it is recognized not as a territory, but as a terrorist organization by Russian authorities.
Umarov’s rise through the ranks accelerated after Russian forces killed his predecessors, Aslan Maskhadov, in 2005, and then Khalim Saydullayev, in 2006.16, 18 Umarov formed the IK on October 31, 2007, citing liberation, and that he was following Allah’s path.6 He divided the Caucasus into six fronts, some further subdivided into sectors, each headed by its own Emir who reported directly to Umarov personally. Although he had declared himself as the supreme Emir in 2007, most Chechens rejected this proclamation.19
Umarov’s Leadership Style
Based upon a detailed analysis of Umarov’s video messages,20 he can be described as an exploitative leader who used his followers as a means for creating, validating, and perpetuating his power in the Northern Caucasus and within the global jihadist community. The tentativeness of his messages reflected a form of adaptive control in which he adjusted his messages in response to the political environment and mainstream media. Umarov rationalized his thought processes and actions while implying a sense of insight into future events from a narcissistic point-of-view. He was hypersensitive to managing social perception, and likely considered it imperative to his survival and role as regional unifier.
Umarov likely anticipated that at some point, perception and reality would converge, materializing into an acceptable variation of his political objectives, but his death leaves this convergence to his successor. Legitimization of his role and the ongoing validation of the IK were extremely important to him, particularly the perception within the IK ranks, as this was his only means of protecting the organization from fragmentation. While he was self-focused, he also demonstrated an emotional attachment to the IK and its ideology as an altruistic participant. The religious context of his messages in effect, served as a recruitment tool for attracting disillusioned Muslim youths and the sustainment of his organization during times of crisis.
Umarov viewed his efforts with permanence and resoluteness, to the degree of denying real-world circumstances and obstacles. This behavior reflected the intent to drive group cohesion by emphasizing the IK’s successes and future objectives, which is a common practice by jihadist organizations. Communications were important as he frequently addressed his followers, providing status of his efforts and the state of the IK as facts and strategic imperatives. His rhetoric followed a tentative format allowing the maximum number of outcomes to align with his insights and forecasts. Contrary to other news reports, his behaviors demonstrated a political savvy and sensitivity to the critical observations of his followers and opponents. It was this political savvy that enabled him to unite Chechen jihadists with other terrorist groups in the North Caucasus as well as extending his relationships beyond the Caucasus.
Mukhammad and the IK’s Future
Hidden away in the North Caucasus, Mukhammad declared his acceptance of the role of IK Emir via recorded video. Mukhammad was born in 1972 in the Sovyetsky District of Dagestan.21 He studied shariah law in Syria in the early 2000s under his nephew, Murtuzali Magomedov. Since 2010, he has held the position of “Qadi,” chief theologian, judge and ideologist, monitoring organizational compliance with the Koran and Sunna.6 It is unclear if he will maintain that role in addition to Emir. He has already earned a position on Russia’s list of most wanted terrorists and will likely take on the priority for “kill or capture” once held by his predecessor.
The IK as an organization will likely go through a period of chaos while Mukhammad seeks to impose his authority and organize his command structure. As a Caucasian Avar, a non-Chechen, it is not clear yet if he will be capable of holding the organization together.22 Mukhammad’s video releases demonstrate an increase in the radical nature of the IK, indicating that he will rule with an iron fist under an extremist’s interpretation of Islam. Umarov’s efforts to unite the Northern Caucasus and legitimize the IK will likely dissipate into disorganization. Sub-factions may form and break away from IK-proper, as has happened to many other violent organizations during periods of major transition.
It is equally possible that the IK will reject Mukhammad’s heavy-handed rule by shariah law. In a video release, he stated “If you consider yourselves Muslims, then impose shariah law, and we shall stop waging war against you.”21 Included in this message was a warning that his men will target those who engage in promoting depravity and vice, such as owners of liquor stores, saunas, and bordellos. He expects strict adherence to the Koran and Sunna.
Mukhammad’s ideological position aligns with the extremist values of the broader jihadist movement, but it fails to demonstrate the larger view and goals of regional unification and establishment of an Islamic state that his predecessor held. He has several pending actions awaiting his attention. Organizations such as the Syrian Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), and the Ukrainian Right Sector expect support in the form of people, weapons, and funding.23
The global jihadist community awaits Mukhammad’s first actions as the IK Emir, particularly al-Qaeda. While it would be a logical first action to build upon the relationship with the mujahidin in Syria because it presents an opportunity to gain access to Assad’s chemical weapons cache, he ordered his fighters to remain in the Caucasus.24 It remains to be seen whether he will inspire and order violent actions or drive away the more liberal Chechen prospects. His rigidity and obsession with shariah law, as noted in his blanket statement of waging war against noncompliant Muslims, may become his Achilles’ heel in sustaining an active and cohesive organization.
Under Mukhammad’s self-admission, he lacks the combat training and hands-on experience that enabled Umarov to evade capture by Russian forces for so many years.25 Although Umarov’s political and strategic competencies are considered far worse than his predecessors, Mukhammad seems to be a step further away from increasing the tactical competency of the IK or garnering international sympathy. With the death of Umarov and the inexperience of Mukhammad, the FSB has the clear strategic advantage, equipment, and force strength to quickly dismantle the IK threat, beginning with a kill or capture order for Mukhammad.