Editor’s Note: The following is an excerpt from “Anatomy of a Critical Incident: Navigating Controversy” by Sgt. James W. Borden (Ret.), which provides an in-depth review of the most relevant and important human factors that every investigator, administrator and trainer should understand when conducting use-of-force investigations and reviews.
Policy as a measure of performance in use-of-force incidents
A policy is a static document that outlines guidelines and expectations for officer behavior, however, a policy is not a decision-making model nor is it necessarily a viable measure of performance related to a critical and chaotic incident. In the context of police use of force, a policy is primarily designed to outline how an officer’s actions will be judged in hindsight, rather than providing a framework for making split-second judgments and critical decisions in the field. Policies are often developed and trained at the Academy level in initial police officer training to provide a parameter to help guide an officer’s behavior, but policies cannot cover the multitude of potential incidents that could occur with myriad contextual factors affecting the officer’s decision-making process.
In reality, officers making critical decisions in the field rely on other training, specifically related to decision-making, tactical training, and heuristics developed over their tenure. These skills are honed through experience, training, and exposure to various scenarios, allowing officers to develop a deep understanding of the complexities of policing and the nuances of decision-making in high-pressure situations. Policies, on the other hand, are often broad and general, and cannot account for the specific circumstances and variables that officers face in each unique situation.
Policies are a necessity, but policies are often written in a way that is intended to protect the organization and the public, rather than providing a practical guide for officers in the field. This can lead to a disconnect between the policy and the realities of policing, where officers are expected to make quick and effective decisions in complex and dynamic situations.
In these situations, officers must rely on their training, experience, and judgment, rather than a policy, to make decisions that are often a matter of life and death. In Sydnee Dekker’s work in human factors research, he implies that policies do not create safety, people create safety.[1] Although, I can’t find this direct quote in any works from my favorite human factors researchers, I know I didn’t coin the phrase. The human factors research books I have relied on and spent years reading and applying to critical incident investigations imply this mantra.
Furthermore, policies are often used as a benchmark for judging officer performance after the fact, rather than providing a proactive framework for decision-making. This can lead to a culture of fear and second-guessing, where officers are reluctant to take action or make decisions, fearing that they will be criticized or disciplined for not following policy, even if the policy cannot be followed simply because the decisions and actions are happening in a novel occurrence. This can have a chilling effect on officer behavior, leading to hesitation and inaction in critical situations.
In contrast, decision-making models and training programs, such as crisis management and de-escalation trained as a goal rather than a tactic, are designed to provide officers with the skills and knowledge they need to make effective decisions in high-pressure situations, with an understanding or threat cues and the associated human behavior. These models and training programs recognize that officers must be able to adapt to complex and dynamic situations and provide them with the tools and techniques they need to make sound, reasonable decisions in the face of uncertainty. These reasonable decisions are then quantified through an analysis and compared to the objective standard in hindsight.
In summary, policies are not a substitute for good decision-making, and they should not be relied upon as the sole guide for officer behavior in critical situations. Instead, policies should be seen as a framework for understanding the parameters of acceptable behavior, based on all the investigative data we discuss in this book, while decision-making models and training programs provide the skills and knowledge necessary for officers to make effective decisions in high-pressure situations.
Consider the use-of-force policy associated with your department or the case you are involved in. What I can say with some confidence is the critical event was not as simple as a traffic stop as trained in the academy, there is always some component of novelty in the incident. As an example, I am not aware of any training involving a moving vehicle where an officer must make a decision where the actual potential is based on substantial bodily harm or death; this training does not exist that I am aware of.
In order to truly evaluate an officer’s performance, it is necessary to consider the specific circumstances and variables that they faced in a given situation, rather than simply comparing their actions to a policy. This requires a nuanced understanding of the complexities of policing and the decision-making process, as well as a willingness to consider the officer’s perspective and the information they had available to them at the time.
By recognizing the limitations of policies and the importance of decision-making models and training programs, law enforcement agencies can create a culture that supports and empowers officers to make effective decisions in critical situations. This, in turn, can lead to better outcomes for both officers and the public and can help to build confidence and competence in the decision-making process.
Ultimately, the goal of any evaluation of an officer’s performance should be to determine whether they acted reasonably and in accordance with their training and experience, rather than simply whether they followed a policy. In addition, it’s also important to recognize that policies are not a one-size-fits-all solution, and that different situations may require different approaches. Policies should be flexible and adaptable and should be regularly reviewed and updated to ensure that they remain relevant and effective.
Moreover, policies should be developed in collaboration with officers and other stakeholders, to ensure that they are practical and effective in the field. This can help to build trust and confidence in the policy and can ensure that officers are more likely to properly interpret the policy.
In conclusion, policies are an important tool for guiding officer behavior, but they should not be relied upon as the sole guide for decision-making in critical situations. Decision-making models and training programs, on the other hand, provide the skills and knowledge necessary for officers to make effective decisions in high-pressure situations. By recognizing the limitations of policies and the importance of decision-making models and training programs, law enforcement agencies can create a culture that supports and empowers officers to make effective decisions.
Furthermore, it’s essential to acknowledge that policies are not a substitute for critical thinking and problem-solving. Officers must be able to think critically and make sound judgments in complex and dynamic situations. Policies can provide a framework for decision-making, but they cannot replace the need for officers to think critically and adapt to changing circumstances.
Policies should not be primarily used as a means of discipline or punishment in a use of force case, these cases are novel in their nature. Instead, they should be used as a tool for guiding officer behavior and promoting a culture of safety and accountability. When officers are found to have deviated from policy, the focus should be on understanding the circumstances that led to the deviation, rather than simply punishing the officer. This may be a policy failing the officer, not an officer failing policy.
When considering the ultimate goal in the investigation is to gather complete data you It’s also important to note that the development of effective decision-making models and training programs should be a continuous process, with ongoing evaluation and refinement to ensure that they remain relevant and effective. This can involve soliciting feedback from officers, analyzing data on officer performance, and incorporating new relevant findings developed from the investigations research and best practices into the training programs.
Law enforcement agencies should prioritize the development of a culture of continuous learning and improvement, where officers are encouraged to reflect on their experiences and identify areas for improvement. This can involve providing opportunities for officers to engage in reflective practice, receive feedback from peers and supervisors, and participate in ongoing training and development programs.
In addition, it’s also important to consider the role of technology in supporting officer decision-making. For example, the use of body-worn cameras and data analytics can provide valuable insights into officer behavior and decision-making and can help to identify areas for improvement. Similarly, the use of simulation training and virtual reality can provide officers with a safe and immersive environment in which to practice and refine their decision-making skills.
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Moreover, law enforcement agencies should prioritize the development of a culture of transparency and accountability, where officers are held to high standards of behavior and are accountable for their actions. This can involve providing clear guidelines and expectations for officer behavior and ensuring that officers are aware of the consequences of their actions.
Finally, law enforcement agencies should prioritize the development of a culture of community engagement and partnership, where officers work closely with community members to identify and address public safety concerns. This can involve engaging in community outreach and education programs and working with community members to develop and implement effective policing strategies.
By prioritizing these values and principles, law enforcement agencies can create a culture that supports and empowers officers to make effective decisions in critical situations, while also promoting safety, accountability, and effectiveness. This can help to build trust and confidence in the police and can ultimately lead to better outcomes for both officers and the public.
Example: Simply presenting an officer with a policy, having them read it, and then testing them on it is not enough to ensure they truly understand how to apply it in a real-world situation. An officer can easily memorize a policy for the purpose of passing a test, but this does not necessarily mean they have a deep understanding of how to apply it in a critical incident. In fact, an officer can read and memorize a policy, acknowledge and sign it, and still not have a contextual grasp on how to apply it in a real-world situation.
This is because a policy is often a static document that does not take into account the complexities and nuances of a real-world situation. An officer may be able to recite the policy verbatim, but when faced with a critical incident, they may not be able to apply it in a way that takes into account the unique circumstances of the situation. This is because a policy is often written in a way that is designed to be general and applicable to a wide range of situations, rather than specific and tailored to a particular scenario.
Furthermore, an officer’s acknowledgement and signature on a policy does not necessarily mean they have a deep understanding of how to apply it. Simply signing a policy is not the same as truly understanding it, and it is not the same as being able to apply it in a real-world situation. An officer may be able to sign a policy, but when faced with a critical incident, they may not be able to recall the key points of the policy or apply it in a way that is consistent with their training.
This is similar to the example of a person studying and passing a test to become a pilot. While they may have memorized the components of the policy and passed a test, this does not necessarily mean they are ready to safely pilot a 747 jet. In fact, it is a very different environment when you are actually piloting a plane, where the consequences of your actions are significant, and the stakes are high. Similarly, an officer must be able to apply a policy in a way that takes into account the unique circumstances of a critical incident, and this requires more than just reading and memorizing a policy.[2]
“Reading is not reality": This highlights the difference between reading a policy and applying it in a real-world situation. Simply reading a policy is not enough to ensure an officer truly understands how to apply it in a critical incident.
“Signature does not equal application": This emphasizes that simply signing a policy does not necessarily mean an officer understands how to apply it in a real-world situation. A signature is not a guarantee of comprehension or ability to apply the policy in a critical incident.
“Training beyond the test": This highlights the importance of going beyond simply testing an officer’s knowledge of a policy. Training should focus on applying the policy in real-world scenarios, taking into account the complexities and nuances of critical incidents.
“Policy is not a panacea": This emphasizes that a policy is not a one-size-fits-all solution to complex situations. Officers must be trained to think critically and apply policies in a way that takes into account the unique circumstances of each situation.
“Simulation over memorization": This suggests that simulation-based training, where officers practice applying policies in realistic scenarios, is more effective than simply memorizing a policy. This type of training helps officers develop the skills and judgment needed to apply policies in critical incidents.
References
1. Dekker S., The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error, 2014
2. This analogy was developed by contributing author Daniel King, AmericanPatrolman.com
