Originally published on the Force Science Institute website. Republished here with permission.
How is it possible that forty-two officers responding to the same training scenario would show almost no consistent planning or execution? That’s what researchers from Force Science, East Carolina University, and Montclair State University found as they analyzed data from their 2023 police response study. [1]
The live-acted 2023 study was designed to explore how experience and training might influence the visual scan patterns and performance of police officers during a critical incident. In the study, active-duty police officers were recorded as they responded to a simulated automobile crash that devolved into a shooting. Participants wore heart rate monitors, body cameras and eye trackers to document arousal levels and visual scan patterns (i.e., where officers looked, when they looked, and for how long). The data provided important insights into the relationship between visual scan patterns, arousal and overall performance during critical incidents. [2]
From vision to variability
While the initial focus of the 2023 study was on visual scan patterns and threat recognition, researchers made an interesting observation as they continued to analyze the data. Although they designed the research so that each pair of officers would respond to the same live-acted scenario, researchers noticed a high degree of variability in the officers’ decision-making and performance.
In this latest peer-reviewed study, researchers detailed how they measured the response variability and offered theories that might help explain the officers’ inconsistent performance. This article summarizes the response variability and describes the researchers’ novel approach to assessing the effectiveness of police training and experience.
Measuring variability
One goal of the police-response study was to assess officers’ responses to the same scenario. As such, a critical component of the study was the consistency in which the live-acted scenario was executed. Dispatchers and actors were disciplined in their performance, and the information provided to the officers did not deviate from the script.
From there, researchers examined response variability in two broad areas and provided the following summary of observations.
Spatial variability described where officers parked their cars, their subsequent movement patterns, and their final positions when the suspect discharged his weapon.
Researchers broadly noted,
- “The parking arrangement of the paired officers was never the same twice, considering both the vehicles’ orientation and their distance from the scene. Similarly, the movements of each pair of officers were unique. This implies no consistent tactical planning and execution across the 42 officers.”
- “The extensive dispersion in the officers’ movements was also reflected in very high [variability] for the officers’ final positions when the assailant fired.”
- “Participants using a more refined visual search were less variable in their final position when the assailant fired than those who had more scattered scan paths.”
Temporal variability included the timing of the officers’ weapon draw, aiming, and firing in relation to the assailant’s weapon discharge.
Here, researchers provided the following key insights,
- “Weapon responses also showed great variability between officers.”
- “While several officers drew their weapons on exiting their vehicles, 36% of the officers did not unholster their weapons until after the assailant fired his weapon.”
- “The most variable weapon response was the timing of when the officers aimed their weapons at the assailant.”
- “Very few officers aimed their weapons at the assailant before he fired his weapon…”
A critical insight for use-of-force investigators was observed in how long officers took to return fire,
“While 81% of officers returned fire, this was, on average, almost 2 s [after the suspect fired]. This is much slower than those times reported in past research. For example, Lewinski and Hudson (2003) report .31 s for simple reaction times (one stimulus; one response) and 0.56 s for a decision-based reaction time. Similarly, Blair et al. (2011) found times of 0.39 s for a shoot/don’t shoot task. Our data show that in complex environments, it may not be reasonable to expect such rapid responses, and that time to react is powerfully mediated by the officers’ tactical positioning [emphasis added].”
Theory: Shared cognition (“Team Knowledge”)
To help explain the officers’ response variability, researchers considered the potential role of “shared cognition.” Shared cognition, sometimes referred to as “team knowledge,” includes the ability of individuals to interpret and act consistently with members of their group based on a shared understanding of the operating environment. This shared cognition is reflected in the use of common procedural and tactical knowledge that results from shared training and experience.
Drawing on the robust literature exploring shared cognition, researchers theorized that the effectiveness of police training and experience may be inferred from the type and degree of response variability to the same scenario. Researchers explained, “This is, to date, an untapped method for assessing police training effectiveness, yet it has theoretical roots in the knowledge and shared cognition literature.” Explaining their theory, “If officers facing the same scenario respond in similar ways, this points to their use of in-common procedural and tactical knowledge accumulated through training and experience.”
Dr. Robert Horn, Associate Professor in motor behavior at Montclair State University and researcher on the current study, noted, “When individuals within groups receive sufficient training and experience, over time, we expect them to develop collective knowledge. That means we expect them to share a common body of task-relevant information, team-relevant information, and shared mental models. With shared mental models, we would expect to see consistency in how group members, in this case police officers, would interpret similar information. While we can always expect some variability, with shared cognition we would also expect to see evidence of adaptive situational awareness and situational understanding.”
Dr. Horn continued, “If police training and experience within a single department is effective at instilling shared mental models for use in critical incidents, we would expect shared cognition to reduce variability in officers’ performance. In contrast, as we pointed out in the study, highly variable responses to the same scenario suggest the absence of shared cognition and may point to the need for more influential training. In that case, we might recommend the addition of high-volume training that combines a variety of situational awareness and decision-making tactical exercises with timely and effective feedback.”
Where to next?
Force Science will continue to explore the application of shared cognition research to policing, and the degree to which shared cognition might result in more consistent situational understanding and reduced response variability. Ultimately, we hope to understand better when assessment and response variability may be the product of poor training — and the absence of shared knowledge — and when it is simply the inevitable consequence of officers engaged in individual and otherwise reasonable perception, interpretation and decision-making in dynamic and complex operating environments.
References
1. Gaze Control and Tactical Decision-Making Under Stress in Active-Duty Police Officers During a Live Use-of-Force Response and published in the peer-reviewed Journal of Motor Behavior, 6, 2023.
2. Horn RR, Lewinski WJ, Heidner GS, Lawton J, Allen C, Albin MW, Murray NP. (Nov 30, 2023.) Assessing between-officer variability in responses to a live-acted deadly force encounter as a window to the effectiveness of training and experience. Ergonomics.
